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The Globalisation of Academe: 
Myths and Reality 
GIOVANNI CARSANIGA * 
Globalisation has many meanings. What is to some a purely 
economic trend others see as some inevitable phase of human 
development, others still as a perverse ideology. In the sense of 
unfettered extension of specific cultural and social contents to 
geographical areas all over the globe, it is a form shaping human 
settlement, trade, finance, ideology, religion, technology, language 
and so on, singly or (more commonly) in various combinations. 
It is the overarching synonym of (or euphemism for) words 
indicating the specific phenomena, like 'colonisation' (extension 
of human occupation), 'civilisation' (extension of culture and 
mores), 'imperialism' (extension of political and economic 
domination), or 'proselytism' (extension of religious or other 
ideology). It is not a new trend: it began in prehistoric times 
when homo sapiens settled all parts of the earth. It continued at 
the dawn of history, witness, among others, the black terracotta 
head, possibly Roman but definitely not Meso-American, found 
in a pre-Colombian site in Toluca Valley near Mexico City; and 
the puzzling residues of tobacco found in Egyptian mummies. l It 
was indeed the very world-wide nature of that settlement which 
allowed a single animal genus to develop separately during the 
past hundred millennia or so into distinctive and self-contained 
civilisations, with their various institutions, mythologies, 
languages and customs. That is why, whatever the contents of 
globalisation, this form is always dialectically and dynamically 
complementary to its opposite, particularity or, if you prefer, 
localisation; and it makes little sense to talk about one without 
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taking the other into account, which unfortunately is what most 
people are doing. 
This dialectic complementarity has been apparent at various 
times in history when particular nations spreading their political 
and economic influence over their neighbours eventually 
saw their empires torn by the revival of those very nationalisms 
that appeared to have been conquered and absorbed. It is no 
accident that the end of the second millennium is witnessing 
both tendencies: the trend towards world domination by huge 
transnational conglomerates and the strenuous defence of local 
and fractional interests. More evidence comes from linguistic 
history. Latin became the global language of the Roman Empire, 
so that many of those who gave it literary distinction were not 
Roman: Virgil and Catullus were born in Celtic-speaking Cisalpine 
Gaul; Horace came from Apulia; Seneca from Spain; Tacitus 
probably from Belgium. But this very force unifying Latin into a 
language spoken and written throughout a vast territory necessarily 
led to its fragmentation into various dialects, which became in 
due course national languages. The same is happening today to 
English, which is already divided into a multiplicity of Englishes, 
not always mutually comprehensible.2 The dialectics of globalism 
and localism can be seen at work in one of its most representative 
embodiments: the Roman Empire. 
How the Empire worked cannot be summed up in a few words, 
but it is not impossible to single out a few general criteria, which 
remain significant even when taking particular exceptions into 
account. Rome successfully imposed its domination also by 
being mindful of local interests. It enlisted the cooperation of the 
conquered populations, integrating its army with the local 
communities, delegating authority to local chieftains, granting 
citizenship and privileges first to important supporters, then, with 
the Constitutio Antoniniana proclaimed in 212 A.D. by an 
otherwise rather disreputable emperor, Caracalla, to all inhabitants 
of the Empire. Thus they gained access to Roman justice, often 
significantly better than local practice. Roman law was based on 
three principles which remain crucial even today: honeste vivere, 
live honestly; neminem lcedere, do not infringe on other people's 
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rights; and suum unicuique tribuere, render to each one his or her 
own. Of course heavy taxes were levied and local produce exported 
to the benefit ofthe conqueror's markets, but on the whole rapacity 
was the result not of systematic depredation but of arbitrary 
arrogance, for which Roman representatives were occasionally 
punished by Senate (remember Cicero's prosecution of Verres in 
70 BC). The structure that came closest to Rome in its imperial 
and colonial practice was the British Empire, whose policies were 
strongly influenced by the classical education of its lawgivers. 
One of the cornerstones of the influence and power of both 
empires, which explains the success of their colonies in attracting 
settlers, or in settling as freemen those who had been sent there 
as a punishment, was that abuse, however widespread, was not 
sanctioned by law, as it still is in some areas of today's world. 
Even the lowliest oppressed citizen had some chance of redress 
in the courts. Roman slavery was cruel, but not totally divorced 
from some sense of responsibility towards the slaves, for the very 
good reason that their existence was the precondition of continued 
and profitable exploitation. Some of them were freed and reached 
positions of importance in society: a few became teachers and 
educators (a process which seems to be reversed in present-day 
universities). 
The executive structure of the Empire was often haphazard 
and unsystematic, yet even in the absence of direct government 
Roman rule was most effectively exercised and maintained by 
cultural and administrative means through a number of quasi-
governmental instrumentalities involving the upper classes of 
subject nations in ritual worship, public spectacles, patronage of 
cultural activities and civil benefactions. Culture and education 
were important elements of social, hence political and economic, 
cohesion and success. Given the amount of writing required, even 
in ancient times, to run public administrations, literacy and 
literature were important. Allied to Rome's military and economic 
power, Latin culture had an overwhelming impact which absorbed 
some conquered cultures (as in the case of the Etruscans and of 
many Celtic nations). But on the whole Rome was very tolerant 
of other languages, mores and religions. The conquest of Greece 
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reinforced those many elements of Hellenism, which Rome had 
already accepted from the Greek colonies in Italy. A minor near-
Eastern cult arisen within the administrative boundaries of the 
Empire, Christianity, suffered persecution because it rejected the 
tolerance extended to the many cults accepted and practised in 
Rome (like those ofIsis, Serapis, Harpocrates, Mithras, the Great 
Mother, the Sun God, etc.). Unlike polytheism, with its plethora 
of competing gods and goddesses, Christianity aimed at 
providing a unified and dominant ideological framework for 
the interpretation of the world. It called itself, using a Latinised 
Greek word, catholic, that is 'tending to the whole' [KUS' OAOU], 
in other words global. So long as the Empire upheld the fiction of 
the divine nature of its rulers, Christianity and the Empire were at 
loggerheads. But as soon as a more realistic understanding 
prevailed of the political power of religion, State and Church 
became allies, and the early disputes about supremacy were 
replaced by a relationship of fruitful complementarity. By Dante's 
times Rome could be identified with Christ and join Jerusalem 
as one of the metaphors for the Kingdom of God.3 
According to the Japanese social philosopher Masazaku 
Yamasaki,4 the so-called Western civilisation, rooted in European 
culture, produced some of the most important social and 
political phenomena in human history (democracy, capitalism, 
communism, imperialism, colonialism) because it was shaped 
largely by the unified religious world view of the Catholic Church; 
whereas the more ancient and equally rich Asian cultures, tolerant 
of many creeds and ways of life, failed to produce a globalising 
ideology. But one should really look beyond Catholicism, because 
the various schisms which caused the adjective 'Roman' to be 
added to its name did not weaken Christianity's secular and 
political expansion: indeed they allowed various forms of 
hereticalIy inspired liberalism and free-thinking to co-exist with 
Catholic authoritarianism and dogmatism. Christianity was 
enriched by them, as well as by Aquinas's gigantic intellectual 
effort bringing together classical philosophy and Christian 
theology. Its proselytising mission, from the Crusades to the 
present time, became the strongest supporter of secular 
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colonialism, imperialism and exploitation. To suggest that 
globalisation brings about general economic welfare and the 
improvement of the standards of living would be just as debatable 
as to maintain that both Empire and Church were beneficial by 
spreading civilisation to the barbarians. 
Perhaps the most common sense of the word 'global isation' is 
restricted to only a few among all possible contents, those in the 
area of trade, banking and other financial transactions, and 
information technology servicing economic needs. This use of the 
word ignores altogether the dialectical relationship between 
globalisation and localisation, and therefore neglects local 
aspirations and interests as if they were irrelevant to global 
development. Thus a potential form, as we defined it, which may 
be realised for either good or evil by different contents, is being 
confused with its actual contents, as if the mere fact of extending 
them all over the world was enough to justify them. World trade 
and world banking are seen as values per se, simply because they 
are global, without any regard to their effects on iocal societies. 
More often than not they are global only in name: those who 
maintain that globalisation spells the end of the national state tend 
to forget that about one half of all the globalising multinationals 
are based in one such state: the USA. Much of present-day 
globalisation is not merely imperialistic and exploitative but 
ultimately even more disruptive and disestablishing than the 
nineteenth-century robber-baron capitalism born out of the 
industrial revolution, itself worse than feudalism, when at least 
serfs and peasants had the right to be protected by their lord. Old-
fashioned capitalism left workers totally unprotected by reducing 
the relationship employer-employee to the mere purchasing by 
one of the other's labour, with no other obligation; yet the disruptive 
effects of working-class exploitation were contained within the 
boundaries of a national state, visible for all there to see, susceptible 
to the political and economic remedies that charitable organisations 
and enlightened reformers saw fit to promote and legislate into 
place. Today, when communication allows capital to be moved 
across the world in a matter of hours and resources in a matter of 
days, globalists export workers' exploitation to faraway countries, 
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and find it easy and profitable to dispense with any sense of 
obligation towards a makeshift out-of-sight workforce whose lives 
they affect from a distance-just like bomber crews, dropping 
explosives from 30,000 feet on people they have in their sights but 
will never actually see. 
A few economic facts. Global production of basic foodstuffs 
stands at 110 per cent of world needs, but only one in ten of the 
world population has enough to eat. Huge food surpluses are 
routinely wasted. The income of the richest 20 per cent is on 
average over 80 times higher than that of the poorest 20 per 
cent.s The pay of Chief Executive Officers, which early in the 
twentieth century was only tens of times higher than the wages of 
their skilled workers, is now hundreds of times higher. Powerful 
financial interests try to give themselves the legal means to 
override national governments, as they recently did by pushing 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investments. The World Trade 
Organisation rides roughshod over national and local interests in 
the name of principles or equalisation and free trade, which were 
already unrealistic in the 1930s, as if small producers in former 
colonial states could be 'equal' to US multinationals. In the list 
of the hundred largest economic entities only about a quarter are 
national stock markets, whose value is often smaller than the 
stock of some big corporations. For instance, so long as Microsoft 
remains unbroken its stock value (around US$546bn) will be 
larger than Australia's (US$424bn). Much of this is being made 
possible by the extraordinarily rapid and exponential development 
of information technology. Its prophets herald the advent of a 
brave new world in which IT is going to change society for the 
better, giving everybody genuine participation to decision-making, 
and universal education over the Net. IT, others say, by allowing 
megacorporations to shift goods, resources and profits across 
peoples and governments, will bring about general prosperity. It 
is now possible to achieve for the first time in human history 
practically instant contact with others all over the world. Some 
therefore suggest that human beings are about to evolve into a 
superorganism, with individual components electronically linked, 
just as the cells of the body or, if you prefer, the members of an 
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anthill, are chemically linked. 
All these visionaries tend to judge technology from its 
power and the means it offers; whereas technology, however 
sophisticated and potentially liberating, is merely a means to various 
possible ends, and it is to be judged by the ends and values it 
upholds. Chemistry and information technology are only links in 
the organism, not the driving force, which is derived from the set 
of principles defining its overall purpose. The many internecine 
wars ravaging our world, inexhaustibly supplied with motives, 
weapons and ammunitions by the hate and death merchants, who 
are also online, mean that there is something seriously wrong with 
society's set of values and principles. Education has always been 
supported by technological development. It is easy for us in the 
computer age to underestimate the impact on education of earlier 
technologies we now take for granted, like writing at the dawn of 
civilisation, or, about half a millennium ago, printing. Printing 
made efficient information retrieval possible for the first time: a 
scholar could refer to an item on a numbered page of a given book 
in the absolute certainty that everyone in possession of the same 
edition of that book could easily locate that item wherever he, or 
less frequently she, happened to live. Whereas a manuscript was 
ultimately the work of a scribe who could, and would, change, 
abridge, add comments to and even misinterpret the work he was 
copying, the printed book, published in hundreds or even thousands 
of identical copies, was meant to reproduce carefully and exactly 
the thought of its author; and was therefore inherently more reliable 
and authoritative. The various technologies successively developed 
to print illustrations, adding half tones and finally colour to line 
drawings, enhanced the information value of the book. Just over 
two centuries ago cheap pulp paper lowered the price of printed 
matter so much that nearly everyone could afford it for education 
and entertainment. Even today, with the electronic book a 
technological reality, nothing beats the paperback: it's cheap, 
portable, it does not need batteries or connections, it is networked 
through any references ·or bibliography it may include, it is 
interactive because one can scribble in its margins, it cannot go 
wrong. 
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I reached university age when the educational technologies 
available to teachers and students were only books, pens and 
pencils, chalk and blackboards and a few stencil or litho 
duplicators. Research papers were laboriously written in longhand 
and, if more than one copy needed to be submitted, given to a 
paid copyist who would produce four or five increasingly less 
legible carbons on a large desk typewriter. Very few in my age 
group owned a portable one. I have witnessed in the past forty 
years the advent in the lecture room of a variety of teaching aids, 
from wire-spool or tape recorders, slide and overhead projectors 
to camcorders, VCRs, computers and video-conferencing. Already 
in 1966 the University of Sussex, where I started Italian studies, 
had a very active and forward-looking Centre for Educational 
Technology. Its Director, Norman Mackenzie, a historian by 
training, had been looking at computer-assisted teaching in the 
USA, and reported enthusiastically to us the latest developments 
in some American institutions. Interactive teaching, programmed 
learning and automatic evaluation of student output, based on 
large mainframes linked to a number of student terminals, were 
already available over thirty years ago, and were duly presented 
as the technology that would free teachers from the drudgery of 
marking, enable all students to access the same high-level material, 
and achieve economies of scale. Language laboratories had been 
running already for a decade, and many saw them like some sort 
of technological Upper Rooms where knowledge would land upon 
the students' heads in the form not of a white dove but of 
earphones, miraculously enabling them to speak in tongues. A 
low-grade supervisor would suffice to administer this Pentecost 
by changing the master cassettes and pressing the relevant buttons. 
Tn the intervening thirty years, which should have been enough to 
bring to fruition those technological promises, we have not seen 
either a tidal wave of effective programmed instruction or an 
increase in language teaching efficiency. Even more startling 
promises are today being made by the proponents of Information 
Technology: we are going to have online interactive education 
with full-color graphics and movies, everyone is going to be able 
to access the best teachers and their best courses, distance is no 
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longer a tyrant once optic fibre cables connect us to the Information 
Superhighway. 
The point the proponents of these bright new developments 
seem to miss now as they did then is that Technology is not 
Science, and Information is not Education. Education is not the 
result of consuming information packages mechanically assembled 
and distributed for profit 6 but a process of moral and intellectual 
growth stimulated and enriched by free interpersonal relationships. 
As a recent report confirms,7 it needs more than targeted 
information: it thrives on cross-fertilisation between seemingly 
unrelated inputs. There is clear evidence that parents and educators 
who wish to improve schoolchildren's basic skills should look 
for increased participation in apparently 'fringe' activities, like 
arts, drama and music; and that sustained involvement in them is 
directly related to success in reading and maths. My own tertiary 
education experience suggests that broadly based cultural 
interests improve specialisation, indeed are essential to it. 
Technology, whatever its level, is very good at providing us with 
the information we need: it has most efficiently done so by 
collecting it in libraries throughout the centuries in written and 
printed form and making it available to scholars. But information 
is a record of facts and events, unstructured by evaluation and 
opinion. Furthermore, about 95 per cent of all the contents of a 
research library is irrelevant to any given subject, and of the 
remaining five per cent which has some bearing on it at least part 
is incomplete, outdated, methodologically faulty, or misleading. 
If one excepts a few gifted individuals spurred by unusual 
circumstances, the mere access to this material will not enable 
people to educate themselves. If students and researchers are to 
make wise, relevant and proper usc of all that is available in 
print, they must have teachers (who need not be hoary old gurus 
but other students and researchers) as filters and guides; and other 
scholars to discuss their work. In other words, they need educators: 
a need which is directly proportional to the amount of information 
available. Therefore the help of quality educators is even more 
essential to make sense of, and find one's bearing in, the 
unthinkably huge virtual library available on the net, which an 
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50 and 80 per cent of tuition fees are absorbed by administration, 
leaving an insufficient amount for course preparation and revision, 
and student assignment reading and marking. These essential tasks 
tend therefore to be entrusted to ill-paid workers under pressure. 
Since the higher the dropout rate, the lower the pressure on tuition 
resources, there is no incentive to stem the wastage and improve 
quality even where there is no deliberate intention to exploit the 
market. Recruitment, rather than tuition, is the main concern. 
That is why those universities, like Chicago, Columbia, Wisconsin, 
Nebraska, Minnesota, Kansas, Texas and California (Berkeley) 
which also launched distance education courses in the 'twenties, 
together with some 60 other institutions and colleges, were soon 
caught up in the same racket as their commercial counterparts. 
After scathing criticism voiced by influential educators or 
government agencies over the next thirty years about the quality 
and completion rates of distance courses, most universities ended 
by discontinuing them, or hiving them off to extensions ostensibly 
unattached to the main institution. 
Those universities that are now rushing into marketing online 
courses ignore past experience at their peril. Their overpaid 
administrators are intrinsically the least likely people to give 
unbiased advice on these programmes, since they are the only 
ones who are sure to benefit. The possible pitfalls are much greater 
now. In the 'twenties and 'thirties tertiary education, while 
benefiting from the endowments and bequests of the wealthy, 
tried to distance itself from the commercialism that made their 
benefactors' money. Universities got on with their teaching and 
research much more efficiently than they do now, when instead 
of maintaining that distance and innovating on the basis of well-
tried traditions and educational principles, they are smothered by 
paperwork, hit by periodical reviews like malaria, haunted by the 
three Furies of accountability, quality audits and strategic planning, 
accompanied by the four Horsemen of bureaucracy, public 
relations, competitiveness and educational marketing. They 
eagerly ape business practice; yet, considering how poorly 
corporate managements all over the world have performed during 
the past half century, not merely in improving the quality of 
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human life (which is what education is about), but also in achieving 
satisfactory economic returns, it is a mystery why universities 
ever thought they had anything to learn from the business world. 
Some academic managers, alas, take the task of relating to the 
contemporary world as meaning that they should accept, and 
import into universities, its worst features: intellectual shoddiness, 
a defective sense of values, lack of concern for the rights of 
others, indifference to generalised social evils, exploitation of 
casual labour. They would defend their actions by proclaiming 
that new technologies offer marvellous educational opportunities; 
that globalisation has an irresistible momentum; that universities, 
for too long ivory towers inhabited by self-indulgent clerics, must 
learn to operate in the real world and bow to its demands; as if 
the real world was a strange supernatural or metaphysical entity 
and not what we ourselves make it to be. 
The real reason for this attack on Academe is not its aloofness 
and unworldliness. On the contrary, if universities had not been 
the mainsprings of scientific innovation, economic debate, political 
reform and social development, often against government policy 
and establishment ideology, the dictators of the first half of the 
twentieth century would not have tried to curb academic freedom 
and sterilize the humanities. What they failed to achieve by 
censorship and repression has been swiftly and efficiently 
accomplished in the second half by economic rationalism, which 
has managed to turn university work from the intellectually 
provocative open-ended educational task it ought to be into a 
politically 'correct' and safe commodity defined by narrow market 
parameters. This absurd ideology, probably first defined in 
Australia by one of its opponents, Professor Michael Pusey of the 
Univesity of New South Wales,lO purports to improve productivity 
by sacking the producers, to stimulate economic growth by 
restricting the incomes of workers who are the majority of 
consumers, to fight unemployment by making people redundant, 
to protect the family by cutting community services, to gain short-
term money by privatising the very concerns capable of long-
term profit and social benefit, to reform the tax system on the 
basis of the demonstrably false principle that consumption IS 
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proportional to income. In the field of education, economic 
rationalists have decreed that, because there is a market in 
education, which is indisputable, the whole of education must be 
turned into a market; which is a non sequitur, like saying that, as 
there is a market for legal services, justice must be administered 
for and motivated by profit. 
After a series of mergers or 'amalgamations' which in theory 
should have produced economies of scale and, as several 
Cassandras had accurately foreseen, resulted in fact in higher 
levels of waste, universities restructured their administration 
on the basis of 'leading edge' business practices, replacing 
cooperation with competition, equal retribution with market 
incentives, and collegiality with union-bashing attitudes. Their 
bureaucracy expanded threefold or fourfold without any 
noticeable increase in efficiency: especially when the rapid 
turnover of administrative staff geared to the experience-sharing 
business model caused a loss of institutional memory; and the 
eagerness of rapidly rotating middle managers to make their mark 
on the system meant that practices, forms, criteria and guide-
lines changed continually from one semester to the next. The 
new managers redefined their work as a kind of economic 
production, conflating educational and organisational targets in 
the form of quasi-product entities and placing them within a 
notional marketplace where they were given a largely arbitrary 
cost-value to be recovered by charging participants. Students came 
thus to be defined as 'consumers' or even 'customers', while at 
the same time being identified with the 'product' processed by 
the organisation: a contradiction in terms if ever there was one. 
Let us now look at the next stage of the economic-rationalistic 
project. The distance education of old relied on gcnerally available 
postal services. Marketing education in today's globalised world 
means selling it to those wealthy enough to acquire computers, 
software, modems, telephone lines, in a location served by net 
connection providers: not what one would call universal access. 
If past history is anything to go by and learn from, information-
rich societies will have the advantage over information-poor ones. 
There is no reason to believe that the growing gap between the 
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haves and the have-nots in the areas of resources and disposable 
income will not also extend to information and education: those 
already information-rich will become richer, the information-poor 
even poorer. Local media producers cannot compete with the 
offerings of the big consortia. In mid-May 2000 Jennifer Katauskas 
from Wahroonga went to the movies in a small town in the 
Venezuelan Andes. The choice before her was: American Beauty, 
The Talented Mr Ripley, Erin Brockovitch and Stuart Little. As 
she wrote in the Sydney Morning Herald (17 May), 'This was the 
same selection of movies available that week in Sydney, on the 
international flights on the way there, and I'm sure in towns in 
every corner of Australia and the rest of the world. Is this what is 
meant when we were assured that the level playing field provided 
by globalisation would allow the flowering of an enriched world 
culture where we could all have access to the products (materials 
and aesthetic) of every other country and culture?' Let me also 
quote Paul Byrnes, who, reviewing the Disney feature, Dinosaur, 
\vhere animals living millions of years apart are seen together, 
asks the question: 'Why do we tolerate this?' 
How can an enterprise that has so much credibility with children be 
allowed to consistently betray that trust with deliberate distortions 
of history, culture and, ahove all, nature? How are parents and 
teachers supposed to combat the politics of The Lion King, a film 
full of coded distortions on race, gender and zoology, when it sells 
20 million cassettes in the United States alone? The great fairyta1es 
of the world evolved partly as a way of telling children ahout bad, 
dangerous and complex things without scaring them too directly: 
metaphor was the carrier of important information. The Disney 
Empire rests on the opposite: you can scare them all you want so 
long as you neither challenge nor educate them." 
Clearly individual educators or universities will likewise not be 
able to compete with the enormous resources and distribution 
strangleholds of production houses like AOL-Warncr, which 
already have contracts with major US universities, and have the 
power to swamp the market in the rest of the world with slick, 
homogenised, ideologically 'safe' degree courses. Contemporary 
universities, no longer interested in acting as the conscience of 
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society, will turn to the more profitable business of promoting 
the interest of the rich. In defending the debatable way in which 
Melbourne University launched its IT company on the stock 
market, its Vice-Chancellor Professor Alan Gilbert declared to 
the 'Four Corners' interviewer: 'Some people in Australian society 
are wealthier than others and perhaps have access to privileges 
more than others. But that ... everybody knows that! And if you 
are expecting the University to behave itself in such a way as to 
change the structure of Australian society, Ijust don't think it's a 
serious suggestion.' 12 The suppression of radicalism, dissent, and 
whistle-blowing research, already initiated by some academic 
administrators and copiously documented,13 will be complete and 
will have been painlessly accomplished. 
At this point I can only sketch a few tentative conclusions. It 
is easy when voicing disquiet over globalisation and IT to be cast 
in the role of a Luddite or a prophet of doom. Nothing is further 
from the truth. Technology is value-free in itself. An aircraft can 
be used both to kill and to save life. Research laboratories can be 
used to banish disease and to create weapons of mass destruction. 
What is wrong is not the new technologies but the roles to which 
they are being put in a globalising framework where the overriding 
profit motive prevents them from achieving the beneficial social 
function of which they are capable. We live in an age when 
telephones are making it more difficult for us to talk meaningfully 
to other human beings, television is warping the way we look at 
things into a series of visual cliches, universal transport has 
eliminated the difference between travelling and staying put 
since everywhere is more or less the same; in an age when 
the manufacture of myriads of choosable products has removed 
effective choice. We must open our minds and realise that 
technology without values, purpose or direction is becoming 
increasingl y absurd and a dangerous waste of time. If I can venture 
a positive prediction, it is that global information technology will 
make it impossible in the long run for its users to go on ignoring 
the all important issues of ends, values, social purposes, which 
are so far being culpably swept aside. It will make it increasingly 
obvious that those who in London, Seattle, Quebec or Sydney 
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raise their voices in protest against the ravages of globalisation 
are not its enemies, but its true and best proponents. Precisely 
thanks to the resources now at our disposal, we can recognise 
that globalisation and localisation are complementary; that the 
extension of new technologies to the furthest corners of this earth 
necessarily demand a deeper understanding of the particular needs 
of those who live there, of their society, of their ecology; that 
universal electronic information is mere noise, like the chirping 
of a modem heard over the 'phone, which needs to be sifted, 
interpreted, analysed, assessed against a set of moral values; that 
what we do over here for our own benefit may have momentous 
repercussions elsewhere, which for the first time we can take into 
account thanks to IT by acting locally while thinking globally. It 
is highly doubtful that the online university will become, as it 
should, a forum for the debate of political ends, moral and cultural 
values and social purposes, if it has to operate in a commercial 
context run by those whose interest it is that those issues to be 
swept under the carpet, aided and ahetted hy those whose main 
purpose is to cut degree costs by half. The ideology of greed 
prevailing in the second half of the twentieth century has 
manifestly failed. We need a change in the twenty-first, and 
educators in universities must not only be ready for it but also 
actively promote it. 
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